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In the years immediately before and after the 1998 Lysøen Declaration, a striking 
feature of the initiatives associated with the human security agenda was the 
prominent role of civil society coalitions, which was widely regarded as indispensible 
to the signal successes of this period. However, the dramatic breakthroughs of this 
“new diplomacy” were the products of a propitious conjuncture of conditions that 
contained the seeds of their subsequent loss of momentum. Yet the human security 
work of civil society organizations (CSOs) continues, in less prominent but still 
important ways, to be woven into the fabric of the more cosmopolitan practices 
promoted by the agenda. In the meantime, their setbacks contain important 
lessons—both for CSOs and for the policymakers inclined to collaborate with them.
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Introduction
In the years immediately before and after the 1998 Lysøen Declaration negotiated 
by Canada and Norway,1 when the policy influence and academic debate 
regarding the human security agenda was most intense, one of the most striking 
features of the initiatives associated with this agenda was the prominent role of 
nongovernmental or civil society coalitions. In short, almost as intensely debated 
as the content of the human security agenda was the innovative means by which 
it was advanced. While the role of non-state actors in catalyzing important 
ethical and political causes in international affairs was hardly unprecedented,2 
the exponential growth in the numbers, prominence, and sophistication of 
these organizations and the campaigns they orchestrated was truly novel. For 
reasons that will be discussed in this article, their role was widely regarded as 
indispensible to the signal successes of the human security agenda, including, but 
certainly not limited to, the Landmines Convention, the Rome Treaty creating 
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the International Criminal Court (ICC), and the principle of the Responsibility to 
Protect (R2P). 
Fast forward a decade and a half and it appears that the breakthrough 
successes associated with this “new diplomacy” have dramatically slowed, if not 
stalled altogether, along with the idea of human security and human security-
linked initiatives themselves.  How do we account for the prominent and 
influential role played by civil society organizations (CSOs) in the Lysøen era? 
How and why were CSOs so significant in this period of time? Why has their 
prominence and influence seemingly waned? And how do they continue to 
support the ideas and causes associated with human security, if not necessarily in 
such explicit terms?
I argue that the dramatic breakthroughs associated with CSOs and the 
new diplomacy were the products of a particularly propitious conjuncture of 
conditions and policy entrepreneurs in the dynamic decade following the end of 
the Cold War. Yet their very successes contained the seeds of their subsequent loss 
of momentum. Nevertheless, their work continues in a variety of less prominent, 
yet highly important, ways. In short, they have become woven into the fabric of 
the more cosmopolitan or solidaristic practices promoted by the human security 
agenda. In the meantime, their setbacks and frustrations contain important 
lessons—both for CSOs and CSO coalitions, and for the policymakers who are 
inclined to collaborate with them.
The Civil Society–Human Security Interface: The Bridge between 
Two Bridging Constructs
To address the ideas of civil society and human security together is to tackle two 
of the most notoriously elusive constructs in contemporary International Studies. 
Each of them is famous for their conceptual ambiguity; their uneasy combination 
of normative, descriptive, and prescriptive usages; and their boundary problems. 
In short, what is in and out of the ambit of both human security and civil 
society? Yet each has had a powerful appeal and influence, both conceptually 
and practically—not least in their relationship with each other. In particular, 
both are boundary or bridging ideas that force analysts and practitioners alike to 
connect different realms of knowledge and practice. It is precisely this integrative 
or bridging role, I argue, that makes them so challenging to operationalize, but is 
also at the root of their appeal.
Civil society has been characterized as “the sphere of ideas, values, 
institutions, organizations, networks, and individuals located between the family, 
the state, and the market” (Glasius, Kaldor, and Anheier 2001, 17). It does not 
take much reflection to come up with a list of boundary-confounding groupings 
within this exceptionally diverse and diffuse category of actors—for example, 
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trade unions, business confederations, and so-called QUANGOs and GONGOs 
(quasi-government and government-operated nongovernmental organizations 
respectively, funded and/or penetrated by governments), all of which effectively 
straddle the boundary between civil society and its ostensible perimeters. Much 
attention has focused on global civil society, “operating beyond the confines of 
national societies, polities, and economies” (ibid.; Kaldor, Moore, and Slechow 
2012)—and indeed, there has been exponential (though slowing) growth in the 
numbers of international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs). According 
to the Union of International Associations, the number of INGOs has increased 
from 22,334 in 1990, to 45,674 in 2000, to 55,853 in 2010 (cited by Anheier, 
Kaldor, and Glasius 2012, 19-20). But of course civil society also encompasses 
national and local variants, often more or less tightly connected to each other and 
to transnational networks (e.g., Keck and Sikkink 1998).
Civil society has been conceived both as a movement, embodying a “dynamic 
of claims and counter-claims for justice” (Anheier, Kaldor, and Glasius 2012, 10), 
and also, descriptively, as simply an arena of associational life between the family, 
state, and market. Similarly, one of the leading thinkers on global civil society, 
Mary Kaldor, has distinguished: (1) a social movement-based “activist version” 
of global civil society; (2) a tamed or “neoliberal version” of nongovernmental 
organizations that have become increasingly institutionalized and professionalized 
in the course of routine collaborations with governments and international 
organizations; and (3) a “postmodern version” encompassing more ascriptively 
based forms of association, such as those associated with ethnic and religious 
identities (Kaldor 2003, 588-591). A related classification distinguishes “supply 
side” and “demand side” organizations—the former providing “public goods or 
services alongside or in lieu of governments,” and the latter focusing principally 
on “advocacy in order to change norms and government policies” (Haddad 
2013, 190). In practice, however, many organizations combine both of these 
roles, including major INGOs like Oxfam that have both robust advocacy and 
program-delivery roles; while in other cases CSOs and CSO coalitions shift the 
balance between these roles and identities over time. Finally, while civil society 
is often associated with progressive, more or less cosmopolitan, causes, it also 
incorporates more conservative, regressive, or “uncivil” elements, such as the 
“Astroturf ” (vs. grassroots) Tea Party movement in the United States (Anheier, 
Kaldor, and Glasius 2012, 14).
Human security, for its part, is a famously broad and imprecise concept—
so much so that many scholars and practitioners have argued that it has done 
more harm than good in advancing humane and humanitarian praxis. Most 
famously, it has encompassed exponents of both freedom from fear and freedom 
from want. This distinction has been characterized by Pauline Ewan (2007) as the 
debate between those favoring a holistic approach, encompassing both freedom 
from fear and from want, and “delimiters,” championing a narrower emphasis 
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on freedom from fear, mainly for reasons of conceptual clarity and policy 
applicability (Paris 2001; Krause 2004; MacFarlane and Khong 2006; Martin 
and Owen 2010). Closely connected to this, human security has encompassed 
an emphasis on both policy imperatives—often urgent—to respond to crises of 
human insecurity, and foundational theory concerning the ethical and structural 
premises of what it means to be secure.  It has also drawn on different disciplinary 
ways of knowing (anthropological, economic, historical, political, sociological, 
etc.), and has straddled local, national and global levels of analysis, among other 
boundary-crossing transgressions.
In my view, the encompassing nature of human security has been, on 
balance, more a strength than a weakness. Specifically, I see the most interesting 
and promising (though challenging) feature of human security as its potential 
to provide, indeed require, a bridge between what Robert Cox famously 
characterized as problem-solving theory on the one hand, and critical theory 
on the other (Sinclair 1996, 4-6; Cox 1986). This seminal distinction is well 
known. Problem-solving theory accepts the basic parameters of the international 
system as it finds them, and seeks to ameliorate and “manage” the action within 
it; whereas critical theory steps outside the confines of the existing order to 
identify both its origins and the forces of change that contain the seeds of various 
alternative future orders. The distinction, therefore, also contains a vital ethical 
element. Critical theory, in taking a fundamentally historicized view of world 
orders and in studying the contradictions that point towards long-term change, 
highlights the potential to identify and work towards normatively preferable (that 
is, more just or emancipatory) future orders. 
Even though Cox’s own project was to elaborate a critical theoretical 
approach, he argued that both problem-solving theory and critical theory were 
inevitable and indeed necessary. This is clearly evident in the case of the manifold 
challenges of human insecurity—whether arising from complex humanitarian 
emergencies, civil and regional conflicts, or heinous weapons systems that 
indiscriminately victimize civilians. In such contexts, human security requires the 
elaboration of real-time responses to immediate crises and the human suffering 
associated with them—fundamentally a problem-solving imperative. On the 
other hand, and in parallel, it requires that these responses be tied to the analysis 
and pursuit of long-term processes of transformation towards normatively 
preferable futures, if they are to be more than repetitive palliations. In other 
words, human security highlights the need to link the pursuit of immediate relief 
of acute insecurity and suffering with longer-term emancipation, in the terms 
utilized by Critical Security Studies.3
I argue in this article that in many respects the interface between civil society 
and the state can be seen as the institutional manifestation of this critical theory/
problem-solving theory dynamic in relation to the theory and practice of human 
security. These two diverse and overlapping institutional forms encompass 
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between them both the aspiration towards, and the possibility of combining, the 
immediate relief of human insecurity with the objective of reorganizing world 
politics in ways that reduce its recurrence. More to the point, without both 
pressure and engagement from the various forms of civil society organizations—
whether activist, tamed, or postmodern—the advances that have been made in 
human security practice would not have been possible, while the prospect of 
more far-reaching or transformative change would be even more elusive than it 
often seems in the current context.
Evaluating the Role of CSOs in the First Two Decades of Human 
Security
What can be said about the roles and impact of CSOs in the first two decades of 
human security praxis, beginning with the UNDP’s pathbreaking 1994 report?4 
First, it needs to be stressed that CSOs can both advance and undermine human 
security initiatives. As noted above, if there is one thing that has grown in studies 
of civil society in the past decade it is cynicism, as well as an understanding that 
along with its many progressive elements, civil society as a descriptive category 
also encompasses many regressive and/or disruptive elements (Anheier, Kaldor, 
and Glasius 2012, 14-15). There are numerous instances of such more or less 
“uncivil” behavior, including, for example, the vigorous campaigns of various 
powerful civil society groups to forestall the negotiation and signing of a global 
Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), and the advocacy by North American conservative 
Christian groups of regressive and punitive legislation towards lesbian, bisexual, 
gay, and transgendered (LGBT) people in African countries like Uganda (Hornsby 
2014).
Second, however, civil society organizations and coalitions scored some 
striking successes, particularly during the first decade of the human security 
agenda, largely through the advent of what its protagonists termed the “new 
diplomacy.” One of its principal exponents, former Canadian Foreign Minister 
Lloyd Axworthy, characterized this new diplomacy as “a new kind of global 
politics … where nontraditional actors, citizen diplomats, have an important 
role to play in the formulation, promotion, and enactment of foreign policy.” 
He went on, “The internationalization of conscience by these new actors has 
been an instrumental tool in the development and promotion of the human 
security agenda” (Axworthy 2001, 5). More scholarly treatments, such as that of 
Sandra Maclean and Tim Shaw, used the more prosaic terminology of “strategic 
mixed-actor coalitions,” and were somewhat more cautious in highlighting the 
formidable obstacles to “getting from informal and transitory advocacy coalitions 
to more authoritative, continuing governance institutions…” (Maclean and Shaw 
2001, 30). However, in reading accounts from some of the practitioners who 
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became deeply involved in these efforts it is hard not to be swept up in the sense 
of purpose and excitement they projected. Rob McRae, for example, emphasized 
the ramifications of new information and communication technologies in 
“accelerating [the work of civil society] movements in terms of the timescale for 
achieving their objectives [and offering up] a potentially global support base” 
(McRae 2001, 241). Reflecting the problem-solving orientation that predominated 
among Canadian and other practitioners, he asserted: “Interestingly, this 
emerging global civil society is not so much energized by ideology or even old-
style politics, as by the very concrete, practical, and humanitarian concerns of the 
human security agenda” (247).
The roll call of new diplomacy successes is indeed formidable.5 Its better 
known achievements include, but are certainly not limited to: the Landmines 
Convention (the Ottawa Treaty); the Rome Treaty establishing the International 
Criminal Court (ICC); the Kimberley Process aimed at stemming the trade 
in “conflict diamonds” and various subsequent efforts to deal with “conflict 
minerals” such as the Publish What You Pay network;6 and the campaigns to 
foster new norms and capacities for the protection of civilians caught up in armed 
conflicts, with particular emphasis on war-affected children, and to foster a new 
Responsibility to Protect (R2P) their citizens on the part of states.7 Moreover, lest 
we think that these campaigns ended with 9/11 and the onset of the “global war 
on terror,” it is worth reminding ourselves of more recent successes, such as the 
Oslo Process leading to the negotiation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions 
in 2008 (Nash 2012). 
The results of these and other campaigns have been more and less 
comprehensive and enduring. Some (for example, with regard to R2P) have had 
remarkable breakthroughs at the level of “entrepreneurial leadership,” but have 
bogged down at the level of “implementation leadership”—that is, translating 
normative principles into real, widespread advances in the human security of 
affected individuals.8 Others (for example, in the realm of human rights or the 
operationalization of the ICC) have triggered adaptive responses and backlashes 
that have partially undone the progress made, or at least triggered deep 
resentments and resistance.9
Nevertheless, and notwithstanding numerous controversies and periodic 
setbacks, these various initiatives have represented real steps forward in the 
promotion of a more solidaristic or cosmopolitan approach towards security 
policy—steps towards the institutionalization of a new concern with human 
security. In every case, moreover, they would not have been achievable without 
active leadership, participation and collaboration between coalitions of non-
state actors on the one hand, and policy entrepreneurs from like-minded states 
and international organizations on the other. This co-dependence was explicitly 
acknowledged by two Canadian diplomats closely involved in the process behind 
the Landmines Convention, who candidly noted that “it was civil society that 
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made the treaty possible, and through the ICRC [International Committee of the 
Red Cross] and ICBL [International Campaign to Ban Landmines], contributed 
to the drafting of its provisions” (Gwozdecky and Sinclair 2001, 37). Thus, these 
landmark achievements demonstrated the potential, and indeed the necessity, of 
forging effective, durable, and adaptable “coalitions of convenience”—contingent 
coalitions around shared objectives. And, although the onset of this trend was 
doubtless foreshadowed by campaigns in earlier eras (Clark 2013, 55-73), it 
dramatically accelerated and was consolidated in conjunction with the human 
security agenda.10 
What explains the success of these novel, mixed-actor coalitions, and in 
particular the impact of CSOs in enabling them? While a comprehensive account 
is beyond the scope of this brief article, a number of common factors stand out:
•  A propitious global political environment in the aftermath of the Cold War 
and the empowering successes of transnational civil society in Eastern Europe, 
Latin America, and South Africa (Kaldor 2003; Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999; 
Van Rooy 2004): In this new era of fluidity and optimism, the demonstration 
effects of successful national and transnational campaigns were powerfully felt. 
Concomitantly, in the scholarly literature the growth of anti-statism on both the 
right (neoliberalism) and the left (post-structuralism) encouraged a new enthusiasm 
for, and openness to, civil society initiative.
•  The advent of new information and communication technologies that, as noted 
above, dramatically increased the speed and reach of civil society mobilization—
often (as in the case of the ICBL) from relatively remote and modest “headquarters” 
(McRae 2001; Gwozdecky and Sinclair 2001).
•  Energetic and imaginative leadership, from both civil society coalitions and from 
a small group of receptive, activist-oriented policymakers: On the civil society 
side, capable, strategic, and compelling leaders, such as Jody Williams of the ICBL 
and William Pace of the Coalition for the International Criminal Court (CICC), 
achieved something close to celebrity status—a status that was firmly reinforced 
when Williams and the ICBL were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1997. Of 
course, the fact that they were increasingly in cahoots with real celebrity diplomats, 
such as Bono, Bob Geldof, Princess Diana, Desmond Tutu, and various Hollywood 
luminaries, strongly reinforced their notoriety. But just as important was the fact 
that they were readily engaged by state-based policy entrepreneurs who, confronted 
by entrenched and conservative bureaucratic and political interests, saw in civil 
society coalitions a means of enhancing their own leverage and outflanking state-
based forces of resistance.11
•  The element of surprise: The very fact that these new forms of diplomatic 
engagement were so novel, thereby catching traditional centers of state-based and 
global political power flat-footed. Elements of this novelty included their ability 
to mobilize media and popular interest/pressure, their capacity in doing so to 
frame agendas, and the extraordinary degree of access they were able to gain to 
sympathetic political leaders and policy makers. 
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Like virtually all apparent breakthroughs in international practice, however, 
the enthusiasm for the new diplomacy tended to obscure the risks and limits 
of these forms of mobilization, and set the stage for a predictable backlash. 
Notwithstanding these early successes, the sense one gets from many enthusiastic 
accounts of this period—that these innovative coalitions were producing an 
irreversible paradigm shift in the way we think about and do security policy—has 
proved overly optimistic. In short, the role of these civil society-state coalitions 
has proved fraught, contingent, and at least partially reversible. Moreover the 
excitement concerning the potentially emancipatory role of global civil society 
has, as noted earlier, given way to growing disaffection and cynicism. Why has 
the number and pace of breakthroughs stalled, or at least dramatically slowed?
Explaining Reaction
A number of factors help to explain this trend. First, the new diplomacy may 
have initially caught vested interests by surprise, but they quickly learned and 
adapted. Some of this learning has taken the form of preemptive restrictions 
on transnationally aligned NGOs and CSOs. One clear and striking example, 
albeit more concerned with human rights than human security per se, is the 
way in which the organizers of the Beijing Olympics (2008) learned from what 
had happened in the months preceding the Seoul Games (1988) and, through 
preventive suppression, ensured that the potential for social mobilization was 
forestalled long before the run up to the Beijing Games themselves (Black and 
Bezanson 2004). Similarly, new NGO legislation in countries such as Ethiopia 
has served to restrict anything that can be construed as “political” activity by 
international and internationally funded CSOs. In the specific case of Ethiopia, 
the Charities and Societies Proclamation, adopted in 2008, effectively headed 
off a recurrence of the popular mobilization that challenged the Zenawi regime 
following the 2005 election—the violent suppression of which significantly 
complicated Ethiopia’s relations with international donors. Over the longer term, 
the Proclamation has also chilled and stifled any NGO work in the country that 
can be seen to have a political or human rights bent (Amnesty International 
2012).
Moreover, within the like-minded states that were the principal advocates 
and partners of CSOs in human security initiatives, activist politicians and 
officials used coalitions with these non-state actors to overcome resistance 
inside their own political and bureaucratic establishments. In so doing, however, 
these state-based activist policymakers attracted bureaucratic resentment and 
resistance towards such unconventional alliances and methods. The effect was to 
constrain their scope and influence. In some cases at least, these activist officials 
perceived themselves—and were perceived by others within the bureaucracy—as 
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what might be termed “insurgent bureaucrats” who, like insurgents everywhere, 
prompted the mobilization of more conservative interests in reaction. The 
coalitions underpinning the new diplomacy rested, in other words, on strategic 
codependence between groups within both states and civil societies, and as a 
result rendered both vulnerable.
Second, for many CSOs and NGOs, especially in what Alison Brysk (2009) 
has termed “global good Samaritan” states,12 the access, opportunities, and 
resources flowing from the new diplomacy led to the compromising of key aspects 
of their core mission. In short, their critical distance from state power-holders 
was compromised and their advocacy role was muted. As discussed above, 
there is a wide range of CSOs pursuing an array of distinct tactical and strategic 
orientations. Kaldor’s activist version, for example, works from the “outside” in 
the realm of transnational social movements, and focuses on the mobilization of 
broadly based social pressure for global social justice and transformation. Her 
neoliberal version of tamed social movements that manifest as NGOs typically 
specialize in the “inside game” of service provision and collaboration with state-
based institutions. The postmodern version encompassing many religious, ethnic, 
or hometown groups, often though not only in the Global South, inclines toward 
a variety of more informal techniques of influence, often in tension with the 
activities and identities of “modern” CSOs in the activist and neoliberal molds. 
Notwithstanding this diversity, however, the collective impact of CSOs and 
NGOs depends on their retaining a vital link to more critical analyses and radical 
possibilities.
The opportunity for close collaboration with governments, no matter how 
worthy the cause, also brings with it expectations of institutionalization and 
professionalization that tend to dull the radical edge of CSOs and dissipate their 
emancipatory intent. This dynamic is often gradual and insidious. It gets placed 
into sharp relief, however, when CSOs’ erstwhile state-based allies are displaced 
by others adopting a much more distant, if not actively hostile, view of non-state 
actors. In effect, this is what has unfolded in Canada over the past eight years, 
with the Conservative government of Prime Minister Stephen Harper adopting 
a much more distant and suspicious approach towards the CSOs and NGOs that 
had come to take for granted a relatively benign and cooperative relationship 
with Canadian state-based actors. The process has left CSOs that were previously 
viewed as partners in implementing key aspects of the human security agenda 
reeling (Smillie 2012; Plewes and Tomlinson 2013). The Canadian experience 
serves as a salutary reminder that, whatever the popular profile and impact 
of NGOs, states—particularly in the OECD world13—enjoy institutional and 
resource capacities that give them major advantages over non-state actors in the 
medium- to long-term.
Third, the issue-specific, niche-based formula for success used to such 
effect in, for example, the Ottawa and Oslo Processes and the campaign for 
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the creation of the ICC, is structurally self-limiting by virtue of the intensity of 
its focus and demands. Early entrants to this arena of causes and coalitions—
like the ICBL or the CICC—benefited from an exceptionally high level of press, 
popular, and political interest that was, in turn, instrumental to the achievement 
of their objectives. However, as a proliferating array of coalitions championing 
other causes attempt to repeat the tactical and strategic formulas that led to 
earlier breakthroughs, the marketplace of causes becomes so fragmented and 
competitive that it becomes exceptionally difficult to secure and sustain the 
breadth and depth of interest that was so crucial to the success of the early 
entrants. Moreover, the demands of coalition mobilization and maintenance 
associated with these campaigns are extraordinary. The ICBL, for example, was 
“a loose network of 1200 organizations worldwide, whose power derived from 
a combination of dedication and new technology” sustained over many years 
(Gwozdecky and Sinclair 2001, 37). Similarly, the Cluster Munition Campaign 
(CMC) that was instrumental in the successful negotiations for the Convention 
on Cluster Munitions signed in 2008, involved 400 organizations in around 
100 countries, requiring an exacting balance of adroit leadership, technical 
sophistication, and inclusive consultation persisting over a period of years (Nash 
2012). Simply stated, this is a hard model to sustain and replicate.  
Finally, while the new diplomacy was far more inclusive and participatory 
than traditional state-centric diplomacy, its democratizing potential has run up 
against some crucial limits that have impaired its legitimacy and effectiveness. 
The question becomes: Which civil society voices are successful in gaining access 
and being heard in the councils of power? And which ones, in the proliferating 
universe of CSOs, are marginalized?
Of particular importance in this regard is the degree to which the new 
diplomacy, and the human security innovations that flow from it, have 
been able to stretch in order to encompass and take seriously the voices, 
needs, and priorities of local communities and their representatives—that is, 
indigenous or local civil societies which are often at the epicenter of human 
insecurity (Richmond 2012/13; Ewan 2007). For example, in the emerging 
civilian protection regime, to what extent are international NGOs, states, and 
organizations truly responsive to, and able to collaborate constructively with, 
the self-protection efforts of civilians and communities that are “the first and last 
guarantors of their own security” (Suarez 2012)? 
In general, despite routine invocations of the importance of indigenous civil 
society and local ownership, the champions of human security in global civil 
society have done less well than they should in seeing, hearing, and prioritizing 
these local, community-based groups and needs. We see this in a wide range 
of issues and contexts—for example, in the deep local controversies that have 
accompanied ICC indictments in a succession of African countries, reflecting the 
profound wariness among many Africans of this human security “triumph.” The 
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general failure to adequately engage and respond to local manifestations of civil 
society has undermined the legitimacy and the effectiveness of the campaigns 
championed by global civil society, and has reinforced the widely held perception 
that it has become, wittingly or unwittingly, a Trojan horse for Western interests 
(e.g., Hearn 2007).
Has the New Diplomacy Run Its Course?
It is tempting to conclude, in light of these challenges, suspicions, and limitations, 
that the breakthroughs of the late 1990s and early 2000s were a product of a 
particularly propitious conjunctural moment, and that they were ultimately 
time-bound and unsustainable. Of course, in many respects the landscape of 
international diplomacy has changed permanently, with a much more complex 
range of actors, partnerships, and techniques to be managed, and a proliferating 
range of wicked challenges to be addressed. From this perspective, the dynamism 
introduced to the human security agenda by the active participation and 
collaboration of CSO coalitions will not be recaptured.
There would be some truth to this conclusion, but it would also be 
overstated and premature. For one thing, the early and spectacular breakthroughs 
associated with the entrepreneurial leadership phase of the human security 
agenda, orchestrated by novel mixed-actor coalitions, were bound to be followed 
by a much longer, harder, and less spectacular process of figuring out how to 
implement these new principles and ideas. For example, how do those responsible 
(in civil society, governments, and inter-governmental organizations) actually 
do civilian protection in complex emergencies and civil conflicts? How can they 
blend the work of the ICC with other forms of transitional justice—or, more 
broadly, with social healing as defined and prioritized by affected communities? 
How can they intervene with life-saving humanitarian assistance in ways that do 
not play into the hands of repressive regimes by freezing displaced populations in 
locations and conditions of bare subsistence? And so on. 
Much of this work continues, and civil society groups are essential to it, 
both conceptually and practically. Some of this work demands that CSOs, whose 
original raison d’etre was mobilization and advocacy, transition, in whole or 
in part, to new roles involving service provision, monitoring, accountability, 
etc. For example, in an illuminating article Heidi Nichols Haddad tracks and 
analyzes how the CICC, initiated as “a purely advocacy-oriented or demand-
side NGO coalition,” underwent an unanticipated process of “hybridization” 
towards “an increasingly supply-side NGO coalition that provides services 
such as administrative support, judicial monitoring, and outreach,” broadly in 
collaboration with the ICC (Haddad 2013, 190).  In other cases, new CSOs and 
NGOs have emerged to work through and carry forward the ramifications of the 
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normative breakthroughs made by earlier advocacy coalitions. For example, the 
Romeo Dallaire Child Soldiers Initiative (RDCSI) is a small but rapidly growing 
organization that in recent years has started to make remarkable progress in 
raising awareness and elaborating doctrine to address and roll back the use of, 
children as weapons of war—particularly among the security forces that have 
typically been viewed as incorrigible by earlier generations of social activists.14
More broadly, just as more conservative vested interests associated with 
states, interstate organizations, and some private sector interests have adapted to 
the novelty and challenges of the new diplomacy, CSOs and their allies can also 
be expected to learn and adapt. As they do so, however, there are a couple of key 
lessons—and tensions—that will need to be kept in mind. First, among both state 
and non-state partners in the erstwhile new diplomacy, there is a need to sustain 
a degree of critical distance from each other. Amongst CSOs, while some will 
continue to play the inside game in relation to state and interstate organizations 
with both positive and less positive results, the sector as a whole must relearn 
the lesson that its strength comes from sustaining a vital connection with more 
transformative ideas and objectives. In this connection, it must find innovative 
ways to bridge its problem-solving and critical impulses. Writing with regard to 
the relationship between CSOs and national human rights institutions (NHRIs) 
in Asia, Renshaw (2012, 312) captures the kind of dynamic that needs to be 
fostered: “It is possible that the relationship will always be one of fundamental 
tension.… The challenge is to ensure that the inevitable tension is a productive 
one.” Similarly, greater efforts need to be made to become much more mindful 
of, and responsive to, local dynamics and groups. There is a requirement, in other 
words, to transcend what Frederic Megrét (2009) terms the “salvation paradigm.” 
Second, bridges must be built between various cause-based coalitions. There 
is a need, in other words, to promote a new kind of human security synthesis that 
may or may not use the language of human security, but that strives to capture 
its normative essence, within and across countries. The often extraordinary, but 
increasingly fragmented, efforts of dozens of such cause-based coalitions must 
be re-embedded within a larger vision of transformative politics if the structural 
underpinnings of ongoing human insecurity are to be collectively identified, 
analyzed, and addressed over the medium and long term.
Notes
1. For the text of the declaration and a discussion of the network that arose from it, see 
Small 2001, 231-235.
2. Witness the role of various non-state actors and advocacy networks in, for 
example, the 19th century campaigns to end the slave trade and foster international 
humanitarianism, or the post-World War II mobilizations in support of decolonization and 
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human rights. See Barnett 2011; Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999.
3. Emancipation is “the controversial heart of security studies.” Ken Booth defines it (in 
part) as “the theory and practice of inventing humanity, with a view to freeing people, as 
individuals and collectivities, from contingent and structural oppressions.… The concept 
of emancipation shapes strategies and tactics of resistance, offers a theory of progress for 
society, and gives a politics of hope for common humanity” (Booth  2005, 181; see also 
181-255).
4. See UNDP 1994. 
5. For a Canada-centric but nevertheless illuminating sample of “new diplomacy” 
activism in the realm of human security, see McRae and Hubert 2001.
6. See, http://www.publishwhatyoupay.org (accessed August 19, 2014).
7. See, for example, www.childsoldiers.org (accessed August 19, 2014).
8. Think, for example, of the repercussions of the different crises in Libya and Syria—
both of which have brought the progress of R2P into serious question, albeit for very 
different reasons.
9. As manifested in widespread African reaction to the activities of the ICC, which have 
thus far been concentrated almost exclusively in that continent.
10. In a January 2013 public lecture, David Malone—one of the foremost scholars of 
the UN Security Council as well as a noted diplomatic practitioner—reflected that in the 
20-plus years since the end of the Cold War, one of the most striking and unanticipated 
developments in relation to the UN Security Council was the explosive growth in the 
presence and engagement of NGOs and CSOs. The same is true of the nexus of issues and 
causes that came to compose the human security agenda.
11. On Axworthy’s attitudes in this regard, see Donaghy 2003, 42.
12. Defined, rather idealistically, as states that “identify the national interest with global 
interests,” and that “overcome their bounded origins as sovereign security managers to act 
as ‘global citizens’” (Brysk 2009, 4).
13. The 34-member Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 
encompassing the world’s most advanced capitalist countries including a growing number 
of rising or emerging economies.
14. In the interests of full disclosure, I should note that the RDCSI is based out of the 
research center that I directed from 2008-2014.
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